verify402

Passerelle gratuite de pré-signature pour agents de trading IA (PASS/BLOCK plus reçu signé) et vérifications payantes basées sur des preuves : cet arbitrage est-il réel, ce token est-il sûr, cette cotation est-elle équitable, et de combien ma taille peut-elle faire bouger le marché.

Documentation

verify402-mcp

MCP server for verify402: a free, fail-closed preflight gate before an agent signs a payment or a chain transaction, plus five paid on-chain checks paid per call over x402.

Works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, OpenCode, and any MCP client that speaks stdio. The free gate needs no wallet. The public demo's paid tools use a dedicated hot wallet funded with Base Sepolia testnet USDC (eip155:84532). The analysis reads mainnet chain data, but the demo never settles mainnet payments. The bridge never signs or sends a trade.

Published package note: verify402-mcp@1.0.9 is published to npm and defaults paid calls to Base Sepolia testnet (eip155:84532) for the public demo. Base mainnet (eip155:8453) requires an explicit VERIFY402_NETWORKS opt-in in a separate deployment and is not enabled by this release. The previously published 1.0.8, 1.0.6, 1.0.5, and 1.0.4 packages are immutable, and 1.0.4 used Base mainnet by default. Do not republish or overwrite any of them.

Anonymous usage telemetry (opt-in)

The bridge can send one anonymous line per tool call to the service: the tool name and whether it succeeded (POST /usage/ping). Never arguments, intents, results, wallet data, or IPs. Off by default; set VERIFY402_TELEMETRY=1 to turn it on. A failed ping never changes the tool's answer, and only these tool names are accepted: preflight_gate, inspect_402, directory_402, verify_arbitrage, check_token_safety, get_best_route, verify_quote_fairness, get_trade_depth.

Tools

toolpricewhat it answers
preflight_gatefree"Should I sign this payment request or transaction?" — PASS / CAUTION / BLOCK with reasons, checked / notChecked, and a short-lived receipt
inspect_402free"What does this 402 actually ask for?" — price, token, network, payee, bound resource, and a PASS / CAUTION / BLOCK verdict from a read-only fetch
directory_402free"What is the x402 ecosystem asking for right now?" — watched public endpoints with protocol and sign verdicts, plus recorded changes
verify_arbitrage$0.05"Is this cross-venue arbitrage opportunity real, right now?"
check_token_safety$0.10"Is this token sellable at a realistic size, and what does the round trip cost?" — TRUST / CAUTION / AVOID with evidence; not a code audit
get_best_route$0.03"What would the chain actually pay for this swap?" — best route + every quoted venue
verify_quote_fairness$0.05"A broker/bot offered me this number — is it honest?" fair / overpaying / too_good_to_be_true
get_trade_depth$0.05"How big can I trade here before the round trip eats me?" — per-size impact, round-trip cost, capacity

preflight_gate is the front door. inspect_402 reads a 402 challenge before an agent pays it, and directory_402 lists the endpoints we watch. Call the gate before signing any crypto transaction or x402 payment request. If sign_allowed is false, do not sign. If requires_ack is true, surface the reasons to the operator. The receipt expires (default 90s); call again instead of reusing it.

For payment intents, policy.allowedResourceHosts binds the host in payment.resource; a matching host can PASS and a foreign host is BLOCK. Without allowedResourceHosts or expectedResource, an otherwise valid resource is CAUTION resource_identity_unverified and resource identity is listed in notChecked. The bridge forwards this policy to the server; the server enforces it.

Two optional caller-supplied checks are forwarded as-is:

  • payment.idempotencyKey + policy.obligation.settledKeys rejects a key the caller already settled; policy.obligation.spentUsd + grantUsd rejects cumulative spend over the grant. The bridge does not persist this state.
  • policy.sellerPayoutWallets is a caller-supplied payout allowlist. A mismatch is BLOCK, but a match is not provenance and never adds payee_payout_binding.
  • policy.sellerPayoutManifest fetches a seller-signed manifest from a caller-pinned HTTPS origin outside the 402. Only a verified manifest whose payTo list matches adds payee_payout_binding. The response includes payeeBinding with the source, origin, signer, expiry, and manifest hash.

The gate is advisory at this layer: the bridge does not hold the agent's transaction key and cannot stop an agent that ignores the answer. Enforcement belongs in the executor that signs — verify the receipt, then sign. See examples/preflight-guard.mjs for a deny-by-default reference that refuses to call the signer without a verified receipt.

Distribution & Run

The package is officially published on npm as verify402-mcp and indexed on the official Model Context Protocol Registry.

Run directly via npx (stdio transport):

npx -y verify402-mcp --help

You can also install it globally:

npm install -g verify402-mcp
verify402-mcp --help

Or run from source:

git clone https://github.com/a32116150-ctrl/verify402
cd verify402/mcp-bridge
npm ci
node index.mjs --help

AI Agent Integration (Step-by-Step)

Step 1: Free Mode (Zero Config, No Wallet)

To give your AI agent the free preflight_gate (checks transaction calldata, payment challenges, payee/amount, approvals, and block freshness before signing), paste this into your client configuration. The paid check_token_safety check adds a quote-based sellability check; it does not execute a transfer and is not a honeypot guarantee.

Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json) or Cursor (.cursor/mcp.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify402": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "verify402-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "VERIFY402_URL": "https://verify402.onrender.com"
      }
    }
  }
}

Step 2: Paid Mode (Setting Up the Hot Wallet)

To enable the 5 deep on-chain truth checks (verify_arbitrage, check_token_safety, get_best_route, verify_quote_fairness, get_trade_depth), configure a dedicated hot wallet that pays per call in USDC via x402:

  1. Create a Dedicated Hot Wallet:
    • Create a brand new wallet in MetaMask, Rabby, or via cast wallet new.
    • ⚠️ SECURITY WARNING: Never use your primary personal wallet, cold storage, or vault.
  2. Fund the Wallet on Base Sepolia testnet (EIP-155:84532):
    • USDC: Get Base Sepolia testnet USDC from a faucet (the bridge pays per call: $0.03 to $0.10 in testnet USDC).
    • Gas (ETH on Base Sepolia): Get a small amount of Base Sepolia testnet ETH for gas if your client needs it. No mainnet funds are required for the public demo.
  3. Configure Environment Variables in Your MCP Client:
    • Set EVM_PRIVATE_KEY to the 64-character private key of the hot wallet.
    • Set VERIFY402_NETWORKS to eip155:84532 (Base Sepolia testnet).
    • Set safety caps MAX_PAYMENT_USD (e.g., "0.25") and MAX_DAILY_USD (e.g., "1.00").

Paid Configuration Block (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Cline, Windsurf):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "verify402": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "verify402-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "VERIFY402_URL": "https://verify402.onrender.com",
        "EVM_PRIVATE_KEY": "0xYOUR_HOT_WALLET_PRIVATE_KEY",
        "MAX_PAYMENT_USD": "0.25",
        "MAX_DAILY_USD": "1.00",
        "VERIFY402_NETWORKS": "eip155:84532",
        "VERIFY402_PAY_TO": "0xAeEF086DD4e436c69d6d0F684b4c9F43392df9cb"
      }
    }
  }
}

OpenCode V2 Configuration

In opencode.jsonc (or ~/.config/opencode/opencode.jsonc):

{
  "$schema": "https://opencode.ai/config.json",
  "mcp": {
    "servers": {
      "verify402": {
        "type": "local",
        "command": ["npx", "-y", "verify402-mcp"],
        "environment": {
          "VERIFY402_URL": "https://verify402.onrender.com",
          "EVM_PRIVATE_KEY": "{env:EVM_PRIVATE_KEY}",
          "VERIFY402_NETWORKS": "eip155:84532",
          "MAX_PAYMENT_USD": "0.25",
          "MAX_DAILY_USD": "1.00"
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

How AI Agents Use verify402 (Prompt Examples)

Once configured, your agent automatically sees the tools in its context. You can prompt it directly:

  • Preflight Gate (Free):

    "Before signing this transaction, call preflight_gate on the payment request / calldata. If it returns BLOCK, abort and explain why."

  • Token Quote-Based Sellability Check ($0.10, not a code audit):

    "Analyze token 0x95aD61b0a150d79219dCF64E1E6Cc01f0B64C4cE using check_token_safety. Can it be sold at a realistic size on the configured venues, what is the round-trip cost, and is the result TRUST / CAUTION / AVOID? Read notChecked for transfer restrictions."

  • Arbitrage Verification ($0.05):

    "Use verify_arbitrage to verify if there is an arbitrage opportunity between Uniswap V3 and Sushiswap for WETH/USDC on chain 1 at the current block."

  • Quote Fairness Audit ($0.05):

    "I was offered 0.35 WETH for 1,000 USDC. Run verify_quote_fairness to see if this is fair or if I'm overpaying."

  • Market Depth & Capacity ($0.05):

    "Check get_trade_depth for WETH on Uniswap V3 to see how much slippage and impact a $50,000 swap would suffer."

Safety

  • The bridge signs x402 payments only. It never signs or broadcasts a trade.
  • Each paid tool call mints one crypto.randomUUID() idempotency key and sends it as x-idempotency-key. A timeout or lost response is retried with the same key, so the server replays the settled verdict (recovery.replayed: true) instead of charging twice. A 402 or 409 is never auto-retried; the error is surfaced to the MCP client. The key is a secret and is never logged or returned.
  • Before signing, the paid client requires the 402 to come from the configured server and a known paid route, on an allowlisted EVM network, to the verify402 payee. It accepts only recognized default assets (USDC), caps the amount at MAX_PAYMENT_USD, and refuses redirects.
  • The whole 402 challenge is checked, not just the option the client picks: every offered requirement must use an allowlisted network, the configured payee, the canonical USDC contract and the canonical EIP-712 domain for that network, an extra.assetTransferMethod of eip3009, a maxTimeoutSeconds that is a positive integer no greater than 300, and an amount inside the cap. A challenge that also offers Base mainnet is refused as a whole rather than filtered down to the testnet option. The client also proves that the requirement it signs is the exact object the server sent.
  • The allowlist can be narrowed or pointed at another deployment with VERIFY402_NETWORKS, VERIFY402_PAY_TO, and VERIFY402_RESOURCE_PREFIX. The bridge defaults are Base Sepolia testnet (eip155:84532) and the public verify402 payee. VERIFY402_NETWORKS is constrained to the supported map (eip155:84532, eip155:8453); an explicitly empty value fails closed instead of falling back to a default.
  • MAX_PAYMENT_USD is enforced inside the x402 client, before a signature exists; removing it is a security regression. The caps limit what the bridge can authorize; they do not protect a compromised private key.
  • The bridge sends X-Verify402-Client: verify402-mcp/<version> and the same version in its User-Agent. This is an anonymous label for /usage, not an account: it contains no wallet, key, or user id, and the server treats it as self-declared and spoofable.
  • preflight_gate is a check, not a guarantee. Read notChecked: it does not screen recipient reputation or sanctions, audit contracts, simulate full balance deltas, audit the counterparty, independently prove payee ownership, persist an obligation ledger across processes, scan tool descriptions or responses for prompt injection, or protect against MEV. It catches the measurable signing mistakes, not every scam.
  • Use the reference executor when you want enforcement rather than advice.

Dependencies and npm audit

This package no longer depends on @x402/axios or @x402/evm. The x402 payer (PAYMENT-REQUIRED / PAYMENT-SIGNATURE / PAYMENT-RESPONSE, scheme exact, EIP-3009 authorization) is implemented here on viem, and the runtime dependency list is: the MCP SDK, axios, dotenv, viem, zod 4.

Why: @x402 2.28.0 depended on zod ^3.24.2, which resolves into GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5 (memory-exhaustion DoS while validating oversized arrays; the advisory covers all zod < 4.6.6, and no patched 3.x exists). npm ignores overrides declared inside a dependency, so installs of 1.0.8 and earlier showed a "high severity" audit banner. The upstream request is x402-foundation/x402#3953.

The current package, installed from its tarball:

$ npm i verify402-mcp
added 123 packages
$ npm audit
found 0 vulnerabilities

The bridge pays the same wire protocol. The only behavior change is cosmetic: npm ls @x402 shows nothing, and the install is 5 packages smaller. The paid-call policy (network allowlist, configured payee, canonical USDC, per-payment cap, tool-bound resource) is unchanged and still runs before any signature exists, in payment-policy.mjs.

Explicit mainnet configuration (not the public demo)

Mainnet settlement is a separate deployment choice, not a bridge or demo default. Do not point this client at mainnet until the service-side mainnet readiness checks, facilitator, always-on host, and wallet funding have been verified independently.

# Only for a deliberate mainnet deployment, never against the public demo.
VERIFY402_NETWORKS=eip155:8453
VERIFY402_PAY_TO=<the payee named by the mainnet 402>

The public demo offers eip155:84532; a mainnet-only policy will refuse that challenge instead of silently spending mainnet funds. The reverse is also enforced: the demo policy refuses a mainnet-only challenge.

Development

npm pack --dry-run

License

Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE and NOTICE.

You may use, modify, and distribute this package, including in commercial agent systems and bots. If you redistribute it or a product containing it, keep the copyright notice, the license text, and the NOTICE file. The verify402 name and logo are not licensed for endorsement.