Talkamore

Một wiki về cuộc sống của bạn tự viết. Lưu từ bất kỳ cuộc trò chuyện AI nào, nhớ lại trong cuộc trò chuyện tiếp theo.

Tài liệu

Talkamore MCP server

A wiki about your life that writes itself — exposed as a remote MCP server, so the AI you already use can read and write it.

Every day you work things out in ChatGPT, Claude, or Cursor — decisions, plans, things you learned — and lose them when the chat ends. Talkamore is the memory layer that fixes that, built on the pattern from Karpathy's LLM-wiki gist: instead of machine-written memory fragments, an LLM maintainer files what you say into persistent, cross-linked wiki pages about your people, projects, and themes. Each claim carries a receipt back to the day you said it. You can read your memory like a document, edit it like a document, and the maintainer respects your edits — after you touch a page it only ever appends.

Two guarantees the server enforces in code (both verified by incident replays, 2026-08-09): the result text of save_to_wiki is generated from the writes that actually executed — never from the model narrating itself — and when a page is full, displaced content moves to a linked archive page instead of being deleted, with the result saying so ("page full — older notes moved to ..."). If the save response says it was filed, it was filed.

This repo is the public integration reference. The server itself is hosted at api.talkamore.com — there is nothing to install or run.

Listed on the official MCP registry as com.talkamore/wiki.

Tools

Tool	What it does
`save_to_wiki`	File content into the wiki. The maintainer decides which pages it touches and links them.
`list_wiki_index`	The wiki's index: every page with its slug and kind (person / project / theme / synthesis / note).
`search_wiki`	Hybrid search (keyword-gated, semantically ranked) across all pages. Returns snippets.
`read_wiki_page`	One page in full, by slug (for example `people/rohan`, or `index`).

Connect

One URL, no token:

https://api.talkamore.com/mcp

Add it to your client and a browser opens to sign in (or sign up) and approve — OAuth 2.1 with PKCE, handled natively by every client below. Transport is streamable HTTP (stateless JSON-RPC).

Claude Code

claude mcp add --transport http talkamore https://api.talkamore.com/mcp

Then run /mcp and pick Authenticate.

Cursor

Add to ~/.cursor/mcp.json, then restart Cursor and approve the sign-in prompt:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "talkamore": {
      "url": "https://api.talkamore.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Claude Desktop and claude.ai

Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector, paste the URL, and approve in the browser.

ChatGPT (Plus, Pro, Business)

ChatGPT supports custom MCP connectors through Developer mode, with full read and write tools:

On the web app: Settings → Security and login → turn on Developer mode
Settings → Plugins → + → create a connector with https://api.talkamore.com/mcp (auth: OAuth) — ChatGPT runs the browser sign-in flow (client ID metadata documents; no registration step)
In a chat, pick the connector under the composer's Developer mode tool — the wiki tools appear in your conversations

On the free tier, use the capsule import at talkamore.com/wiki instead: ask ChatGPT what it knows about you, paste the answer, and the maintainer files it into pages.

Manual setup (token URL)

For clients that cannot open a sign-in browser, a personal token URL still works: sign in at talkamore.com/wiki, open Connect AIs → Manual setup, and use https://api.talkamore.com/mcp/YOUR_TOKEN. The token is the whole auth — treat that URL as a secret.

Use it

End of a session:

save this to my talkamore wiki

Start of the next one:

check my talkamore wiki about the launch plan

The point is the loop: what you work out in one chat is waiting in the next, in any client, and it compounds instead of resetting.

Security

OAuth: S256 PKCE only, single-use 60s authorization codes, refresh rotation — reuse of a rotated token revokes the whole grant
Disconnect any client from talkamore.com/wiki; its next call is refused
Tokens and codes are stored as SHA-256 digests only
All wiki content is encrypted at rest with per-user keys (envelope encryption)
Every credential is scoped to one user's wiki; there is no cross-user surface