QMP-MCP
Create, run and manage qemu virtual machines
Documentation
qmp-mcp
qmp-mcp is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that gives an AI agent the controls of a single QEMU virtual machine. The agent describes the hardware it wants; the server builds that machine, boots it, and exposes a set of tools to drive it — pause and resume it, reset it, watch its screen, send it low-level QEMU commands, react to its events, and tear it down when it's finished.
The whole design rests on one idea: the tools are the boundary. The agent never hands raw arguments to QEMU or reaches into your filesystem. It fills in a structured, validated description of the machine; the server turns that into a locked-down QEMU command line and mediates every request. Everything the agent can touch — disk images, boot media, the commands it can run against the live VM, the ports it can open — passes through allowlists you control. The VM is the blast radius, and the tools are the walls.
It ships as two interchangeable implementations — one in TypeScript, one in Rust — that behave identically. This page explains what the server is and how it thinks; the per-implementation READMEs cover installing, running, and deploying each one.
New to the vocabulary?
CONTEXT.mdis the one-page glossary. The words below — Instance, Guest, Hardware Spec, Command Policy, Image Store, Viewer — each mean something specific, and this README uses them deliberately.
How it works
One machine at a time: the Instance
The server manages exactly one Instance — the running qemu-system-* process together
with its hardware configuration and the live control connection to it. There's never more
than one; asking to create another while one exists is refused. An Instance's life is tied
to the server's: shut the server down and it tears the VM down with it, so nothing is left
orphaned.
An Instance moves through a small lifecycle — from nothing, to starting, to running, optionally paused and back, to stopped, and back to nothing:
NONE → STARTING → RUNNING ⇄ PAUSED → STOPPED → NONE
If the underlying QEMU process exits on its own — a guest shutdown, a crash, an external
kill — the server notices and reconciles back to NONE, so the next request starts from a
clean slate.
The thing running inside the Instance — the operating system or workload — is the Guest. The server manages the machine; what you install and run on it is up to you and your agent.
Describing the machine: the Hardware Spec
The agent doesn't run QEMU. It submits a Hardware Spec — a structured, validated description of the machine it wants: machine type and CPU, how many vCPUs and how much memory, which disks and boot media, the network, the display, the accelerator. The server validates every field and generates the QEMU command line from it. The agent never supplies raw argv.
A spec is just the JSON arguments to create_instance:
{
"machine": "q35",
"cpu": "host",
"vcpus": 2,
"memoryMb": 2048,
"accel": "auto",
"disks": [{ "image": "root.qcow2" }],
"cdrom": { "iso": "debian-13.iso" },
"boot": "dc",
"display": "vnc"
}
Validation isn't a formality — it's the safety boundary. Fields are range- and
character-checked, and anything that could smuggle an extra option into the command line (a
stray comma in a disk entry, say) is escaped or rejected. Sizes are capped, with ceilings
you set on disk, memory, and vCPUs. If a spec is invalid, create_instance fails before
QEMU is launched, with a message that says exactly what was wrong.
There is an escape hatch — extraArgs, which appends raw QEMU flags to the generated command line — but it's off unless you explicitly enable it. It's meant for trusted, single-tenant setups where you've decided the agent can be handed the keys.
Which architecture you emulate falls out of the machine: the server picks the emulator
for you — q35/pc launch qemu-system-x86_64, while virt and the raspi* boards
launch qemu-system-aarch64 — so switching architectures is just a different machine,
no restart. QMP_MCP_QEMU_BINARY overrides that choice for every Instance (e.g. a custom
build or qemu-system-riscv64), and accel: auto only uses KVM when the guest arch
matches the host, falling back to TCG across architectures (ADR-0013).
Some machines don't boot from a disk at all. QEMU's Raspberry Pi boards (raspi3b and
friends) have fixed hardware — a set CPU, core count, and RAM — and they expect the kernel
handed to them directly rather than read off an SD-card bootloader. For those the spec grows
three optional fields: kernel and dtb (a kernel image and device-tree blob, each
a name in the Image Store) and appendCmdline (the kernel command line). The server
emits -kernel/-dtb/-append and, because the board's hardware is fixed, omits
-cpu/-smp/-m; attach the SD image with "interface": "sd" (sized to a power of two, or
QEMU refuses it). These boards also have no PCI bus, so the default NIC can't attach — pick
network.model usb-net (their USB NIC) or network.mode none; the server refuses an
unattachable NIC up front rather than letting QEMU abort. None of this is Pi-only — any
direct-kernel boot (a bare virt machine, say) can use kernel/appendCmdline alongside the
usual CPU and memory settings.
How fast it runs: the accelerator
accel: "auto" (the default) uses hardware KVM when the host can reach a /dev/kvm,
and otherwise falls back to TCG software emulation — reporting which it chose. Ask for
kvm explicitly and it fails loudly if KVM isn't available; ask for tcg and you always
get portable, zero-privilege emulation. KVM is never required — it's a performance upgrade
you opt into, not a privilege the server demands.
Driving the running VM: the QMP Session
Once an Instance is up, the server talks to it over the QMP Session — QEMU's own
Machine Protocol, a JSON control channel on a private socket the server owns and never
exposes on the network. The server negotiates the session at launch (reads the greeting,
sends qmp_capabilities), and from then on every "drive the VM" tool is a QMP command
underneath: pause_instance stops the CPUs, get_status asks QEMU its run state,
screendump grabs a framebuffer snapshot, and so on.
For anything without a purpose-built tool, there's qmp_execute — a generic "run this QMP
command" — which brings us to the guardrail on it.
What the agent may command: the Command Policy
qmp_execute could in principle run any QMP command, which is both powerful and
dangerous. The Command Policy decides which ones actually go through. Out of the box
it's a safe-by-default allowlist; genuinely dangerous commands — migrate,
dump-guest-memory, human-monitor-command, and their kin — sit behind a hard denylist
that can't be re-enabled. You can widen or narrow the middle ground with an environment
variable or a policy file.
One subtlety: the policy gates commands by name, not by their arguments. So a command whose arguments could be dangerous — a screen capture that writes to a host file, for instance — isn't exposed through the generic tool at all. It gets a purpose-built tool that validates the arguments for you.
Where files live: the Image Store and ISO Store
The agent refers to disks and boot media by name, never by host path — and those names resolve inside two folders you designate:
- The Image Store is a single read-write directory for guest disk images. The agent can list what's there and create new blank images in it, and disks in a spec are looked up by name within it.
- The ISO Store is a separate read-only directory for installation and boot ISOs. Keeping it distinct means install media can never be written to.
Both are enforced with real-path containment: a name that tries to climb out — ../, an
absolute path, a symlink pointing elsewhere — is refused. These two folders are the
agent's view of the filesystem — the only exception is an optional virtio-9p folder
share the operator can enable (QMP_MCP_HOST_SHARE_DIR), which a spec opts into with
share: true; it too is operator-configured (the agent never names the host path) and
read-only by default (ADR-0014).
Sandboxed networking
Guests get user-mode networking by default — a sandboxed NAT stack, no host privileges, no bridge. To reach a service inside the guest you add host forwards, and those are bounded: only ports in a non-privileged range, bound to loopback.
{ "network": { "hostForwards": [{ "hostPort": 2222, "guestPort": 22 }] } }
Host-level networking (tap/bridge) exists but is gated off unless you turn it on — it
needs privileges that don't fit the server's unprivileged posture.
Watching what happens: events, the Display, and the Viewer
Two ways to see what the VM is doing:
- Events. QEMU emits async events — a reset, a shutdown, a device change. The server
keeps a bounded ring buffer of the recent ones for the current Instance, and the agent
reads it pull-style:
get_eventsdrains what's new since a cursor,wait_for_eventblocks until a named event arrives (or times out). No firehose to manage. - The Display and the Viewer. Ask for a
vncDisplay in the spec and QEMU exposes the guest's screen over VNC, on loopback only. Turn on the Viewer — an optional, in-process noVNC bridge — and you can watch and control that screen in a browser. The Viewer is password-gated and reads the Display only; it never touches the QMP Session. It's ideal for babysitting an OS installer, or just seeing what the agent sees. Most machines (virt,q35, …) have no built-in display, so pairdisplay: vncwith adisplayDevice—virtio-gpu(a real GPU with DRM, so Wayland/X desktops render),vga, orramfb. Usevgafor a live ISO or any boot where the boot menu / early console must be visible:virtio-gpushows nothing until the guest loads its DRM driver, so an ISO's bootloader can't draw on it. Theraspi*boards render over their built-in framebuffer, so they staydisplayDevice: none. (Booting a distro this way also takesinitrdalongsidekernel— the usual kernel + initramfs + rootfs.)
Talking to the server: transports and authentication
The server speaks MCP over stdio (the default — how most clients launch a server
directly; no network, no auth) or over HTTP (for a networked deployment), or both at
once. The HTTP transport is fail-closed: it refuses to start without authentication —
an API key, or a signed HS256 token — unless you explicitly opt into insecure mode for
local use. A server that can build and run VMs has no business being reachable
unauthenticated. It runs as a non-root user in every mode and never needs --privileged.
The tools
The agent's vocabulary — the actions it can take:
| Tool | What it does |
|---|---|
create_instance / destroy_instance | build & launch the Instance from a Hardware Spec / tear it down |
get_instance / get_status | the current Instance + lifecycle state / the live guest run state |
get_share | report the host↔guest folder-sharing config + the exact 9p mount command for the guest |
pause_instance / resume_instance | freeze / unfreeze the guest CPUs |
reset_instance / powerdown_instance | hard reset / request a graceful ACPI shutdown |
list_block_devices / query_cpus | the VM's disks & backing media / per-CPU info |
screendump | a PNG screenshot of the Display |
get_events / wait_for_event | recent QEMU events / block until a named one arrives |
qmp_execute | a raw QMP command, gated by the Command Policy |
create_image / list_images / list_isos | make a disk image / list disks / list boot ISOs |
For the exact per-implementation tool tables, see the TypeScript and Rust READMEs.
Quick start: common scenarios
The server runs wherever QEMU is installed. First get one of the implementations running
and point your MCP client at it —
run the TypeScript variant or
run the Rust variant — then ask your agent to do something.
The scenarios below are what that looks like: each is a Hardware Spec (the arguments to
create_instance) plus whatever you had to put in place first.
1. A scratch VM to poke at
Nothing to set up — just ask for a small machine and drive it.
"Boot a 1 GB Linux VM and tell me its run state."
The agent calls create_instance with a minimal spec, then get_status; destroy_instance
cleans up:
{ "machine": "q35", "cpu": "host", "vcpus": 1, "memoryMb": 1024, "accel": "auto" }
(With no disk or ISO there's nothing to boot — perfect for a smoke test; add media for the real thing.)
2. Install an OS from an ISO
Put the installer ISO in your ISO Store folder; the agent creates a blank disk for it
and boots from the CD first (boot: "dc").
"Create a 20 GB disk and install Debian from debian-13.iso onto it."
It calls create_image (into the Image Store), then create_instance:
{
"machine": "q35", "cpu": "host", "vcpus": 2, "memoryMb": 2048, "accel": "auto",
"disks": [{ "image": "debian.qcow2" }],
"cdrom": { "iso": "debian-13.iso" },
"boot": "dc",
"display": "vnc"
}
Because it asked for display: "vnc", you can watch the installer run — see scenario 4.
3. A headless server you can SSH into
Add a host forward so a port on your host reaches a port in the guest.
"Run my server image headless and forward host port 2222 to guest 22."
{
"machine": "q35", "cpu": "host", "vcpus": 2, "memoryMb": 2048, "accel": "auto",
"disks": [{ "image": "server.qcow2" }],
"network": { "hostForwards": [{ "hostPort": 2222, "guestPort": 22 }] }
}
Once it's booted, ssh -p 2222 user@localhost from the host reaches the guest's SSH.
4. Watch it in a browser
Set QMP_MCP_VIEWER_PASSWORD, ask for a vnc display, and open the Viewer. The setup
details are in the TypeScript /
Rust READMEs; any spec with "display": "vnc" then gets a
live, interactive screen at http://<host>:6080/.
5. Emulate a different architecture
Pick an ARM machine and CPU — the qemu-system-aarch64 emulator is chosen automatically
from the machine (no QMP_MCP_QEMU_BINARY needed).
"Bring up an ARM64 virtual machine."
{ "machine": "virt", "cpu": "cortex-a72", "vcpus": 2, "memoryMb": 2048, "accel": "tcg" }
On an x86 host accel: auto already resolves to TCG (an aarch64 guest can't use x86
KVM). On an ARM host it would use KVM, which only accepts a host/max CPU — so a named
model like cortex-a72 there needs accel: tcg (as above), and the raspi* boards
always run under TCG (their baked CPU can't be virtualized).
(If you also need to build the Rust binary for a non-x86 host, see its cross-compilation guide.)
6. Emulate a Raspberry Pi board
QEMU's Raspberry Pi machines boot a kernel directly and render a framebuffer you can watch
in the browser Viewer. Put the extracted kernel and device tree in the Image Store (the
raspi* machines select qemu-system-aarch64 for you), and:
"Boot a Raspberry Pi 3 and show me the console."
{
"machine": "raspi3b",
"accel": "tcg",
"kernel": "kernel8.img",
"dtb": "bcm2710-rpi-3-b.dtb",
"appendCmdline": "console=tty1 root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 rootwait rw",
"disks": [{ "image": "raspios.img", "interface": "sd", "format": "raw" }],
"network": { "model": "usb-net" },
"display": "vnc"
}
console=tty1 puts the console on the framebuffer, so the noVNC Viewer shows the Pi booting
— logos and all. No cpu/vcpus/memoryMb: the board's hardware is fixed. The Pi has no
PCI bus, so the default NIC can't attach — use "network": { "model": "usb-net" } for its USB
NIC, or "network": { "mode": "none" } for no networking at all. (On a Pi 3, merge the
disable-bt device-tree overlay into the dtb first, or the console stays glued to the
Bluetooth-shared UART instead of the screen.)
Choosing an implementation
The two are interchangeable — same tools, same specs, same behavior, continuously checked against each other. Pick by ecosystem:
| TypeScript | Rust | |
|---|---|---|
| Built on | Node + mcp-framework | rmcp + tokio |
| Ships as | an npm package / node dist/index.js | a single self-contained binary |
| Get it running | Run it → | Run it → |
| In Docker | Docker → | Docker → |
Everything deployment- and usage-specific lives in those two READMEs:
- TypeScript — Run it · Transports & auth · Docker · Browser viewer · Configuration · Developing
- Rust — Run it · Transports & auth · Docker · KVM acceleration · Browser viewer · Cross-compilation · Configuration · Developing
Configuration
Both implementations are configured entirely through QMP_MCP_* environment variables —
the same names and defaults for each. The fully-commented reference is
.env.example, and the command-policy file format is
policy.example.yaml. The ones you'll reach for:
| Variable | Default | What it does |
|---|---|---|
QMP_MCP_TRANSPORT | stdio | stdio, http, or both |
QMP_MCP_API_KEYS | (unset) | API keys for the HTTP transport (required unless insecure) |
QMP_MCP_QEMU_BINARY | (derived from machine) | usually unset — the emulator is derived from the machine (q35→x86_64, virt/raspi*→aarch64, ADR-0013); set it to force one emulator for every Instance |
QMP_MCP_IMAGE_DIR / QMP_MCP_ISO_DIR | XDG paths | the Image Store / ISO Store folders |
QMP_MCP_VIEWER_PASSWORD | (unset) | enables the browser Viewer |
QMP_MCP_VIEWER_USER | (unset) | optional username enforced on the Viewer's HTTP Basic auth (default: username ignored, password-only) |
QMP_MCP_HOST_SHARE_DIR | (unset) | absolute host dir shared into guests via virtio-9p when a spec sets share: true (unset ⇒ sharing off; ADR-0014) |
QMP_MCP_GUEST_SHARE_DIR | (unset) | intended guest mountpoint (advisory) — get_share reports the exact mount -t 9p command |
QMP_MCP_ALLOW_SHARE_WRITE | false | mount the share read-write (default read-only; the agent can never escalate) |
QMP_MCP_ALLOW_RAW_ARGS | false | allow a spec's extraArgs (the escape hatch) |
…plus caps on disk/memory/vCPUs, the host-forward port range, the Command Policy allow/deny
lists and policy file, and the Event Buffer size. See .env.example for
the full list, or each variant's Configuration section in context
(TypeScript · Rust).
For developers
Layout
qmp-mcp/
├── typescript/ the Node / mcp-framework implementation
├── rust/ the Rust / rmcp implementation
├── testdata/ shared golden fixtures both implementations assert
├── docs/ design notes and rationale
├── CONTEXT.md the domain glossary — the shared vocabulary
├── .env.example every QMP_MCP_* variable, commented
└── policy.example.yaml the command-policy file format
The two implementations are independent codebases that share three things at the root: the
domain model (CONTEXT.md — read it first), the golden fixtures
(testdata/), and the config surface (.env.example).
How the two stay identical
Parity here isn't a promise, it's a test. testdata/ holds language-neutral
golden fixtures that pin the exact QEMU command line each Hardware Spec must produce and the
exact verdict the Command Policy must return — and both implementations are tested
against that same corpus. Change how a spec becomes a command line, or what the policy
allows, and you update the shared fixture; the TypeScript suite and the Rust suite have to
agree, or the build fails. Teach one implementation a new trick and you add the fixture the
other has to satisfy.
Working on a variant is self-contained in its folder —
developing TypeScript ·
developing Rust. The docs/ folder holds the
longer-form rationale behind the trickier decisions.
License
MIT.