openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp

MCP server for security-vetting third-party AI agent extensions before installation — Claude skills, ClawHub plugins, agent tool packs. 41 detection rules; outputs 0-100 risk score + BLOCK/REVIEW/CAUTION/CLEAN.

openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp

MCP server for security-vetting third-party AI agent extensions before installation — Claude skills, ClawHub plugins, agent tool packs, any code-shaped artifact that runs in your agent environment with your API keys. 41 detection rules across prompt-injection patterns, hardcoded exfiltration channels (Discord/Slack/Telegram webhooks, SSH-key reads, AWS-creds reads), dangerous dynamic execution (eval, exec, subprocess shell=True, pickle.loads), manifest/permission drift, and known typosquat dependencies. Outputs a 0-100 risk score + BLOCK/REVIEW/CAUTION/CLEAN bucket + per-finding evidence. Native ClawHub manifest support; the rule engine generalizes to any code-shaped extension via Custom MCP Build adapters. Keywords: AI agent security, plugin vetting, supply-chain security, prompt injection detection, MCP static analysis.

Status: v1.1.2 Tests: 145 passing License: MIT MCP PyPI


What it does

Third-party AI agent extensions — Claude skills, ClawHub plugins, MCP servers themselves, agent tool packs, npm-distributed agent code — are code that runs inside your environment with your API keys, your filesystem access, your network egress. The supply-chain attack surface is now broadly recognized + actively exploited:

The same shape of attack works against any third-party extension a user installs into their AI agent runtime — Claude skills, MCP servers, browser-extension agents, npm-distributed agent code. The defensive question every operator faces before clicking install: "is this safe to run with my API keys?"

This MCP server runs a battery of static-analysis scanners against any skill's directory and produces a single VetReport that an operator can act on:

> claude: vet the data-extractor skill before I install it.
[MCP tool: vet_skill]

Skill 'data-extractor': BLOCK — do not install.
Risk score: 100/100. Findings: 1 critical, 4 high, 1 info.

Critical:
  EXFIL.WEBHOOK_DISCORD (extract.py:5) —
    Hardcoded Discord webhook URL: 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/...'
    Recommendation: Refuse install unless explicitly justified.

High:
  AST.OS_SYSTEM (extract.py:14) — os.system('curl ... | bash')
  EXFIL.ENV_DUMP (extract.py:9) — dumps full os.environ
  MANIFEST.WILDCARD_PERMISSION — `network.http: *`
  ...

Vet result for data-extractor: REFUSE INSTALL.
> claude: any flagged skills currently installed?
[MCP tool: flagged_skills_report]

2 skills flagged at REVIEW or BLOCK:
  - data-extractor       BLOCK   risk_score=100   1 CRITICAL EXFIL.WEBHOOK_DISCORD
  - markdown-formatter   REVIEW  risk_score=35    1 HIGH AST.EVAL_CALL on user input

Why openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp

Three things existing tools (manual code review, generic SAST, ClawHub trust scores) don't do:

  1. Skill-aware scanning. Generic SAST tools don't know what an OpenClaw skill manifest looks like. They miss the most common malware shape: a "calculator" skill that requests network.http: *. The vetter cross-checks declared purpose against requested permissions.

  2. Risk score the operator can paste into a ticket. Not "high cyclomatic complexity" — BLOCK — Discord webhook at extract.py:5. Each finding has rule_id, file:line, evidence, and a specific recommendation.

  3. Built for review-before-install, not after-the-fact audit. Run it from inside Claude on a skill you're about to add. Get a verdict in seconds. Refuse the install if it's BLOCK; sandbox-test if REVIEW; install if CLEAN.

Built for the production-AI operator who has been bitten (or doesn't want to be) by ClawHavoc-style supply-chain attacks.

How this fits in the OpenClaw security ecosystem

The OpenClaw security crisis has spawned a multi-vendor tooling landscape. This server's place in it:

LayerVendor / projectPosture
Enterprise SaaS / SOCCisco DefenseClaw, ClawSecure Watchtower, Zscaler ThreatLabz, NemoClawServer-side, paid, integration-heavy, SIEM-aimed. Best fit for organizations with existing security teams + SOC infrastructure.
Best-practices guidanceMicrosoft Security Blog, CrowdStrike, ConsciaEducational. No tooling.
Open-source / communitySecureClaw, openclaw-security-monitor, openclaw-dashboard, slowmist's hardening guideSelf-hosted runtime + dashboard tooling. Generally separate process / web UI.
MCP-native (this layer)openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp (this server) + openclaw-output-vetter-mcp (claim verification) + openclaw-upgrade-orchestrator-mcp (regression catalog + provider-fingerprint)Inline in the agent's own conversation — Claude Desktop / Cursor / Cline calls these tools directly during a turn. Sub-second, free, MIT, local, read-only. The operator-tooling layer one step closer to the agent than enterprise SIEM covers.

This server isn't a replacement for the SaaS layer — large organizations should pair both. It's a replacement for manual code review of every ClawHub skill before install, with a verdict an operator can paste into a ticket in seconds.


Tool surface

ToolWhat it returns
vet_skillFull VetReport for one skill: risk_score, risk_level, sorted findings, summary
vet_skill_directoryAggregate report across every skill in the directory + per-bucket counts
installed_skills_overviewLightweight: just bucket counts + flagged skill IDs
flagged_skills_reportJust REVIEW + BLOCK skills with their findings
scan_for_prompt_injectionFocused: only prompt-injection findings on one skill
scan_for_exfiltrationFocused: only exfiltration findings on one skill
list_detection_rulesCatalog of every rule the server applies (transparency)
vet_agent_config (v1.1+)NEW — scan a project DIRECTORY for adversarial agent-config files (AGENTS.md, .gemini/config, .cursor/rules.md / .cursorrules, .claude/CLAUDE.md, auto-firing git hooks). Returns the same Finding shape; covers prompt-injection, exfiltration channels, embedded shell commands, secret-file references, and git-hook-install patterns. Targets the Cursor CVE-2026-26268 / Gemini-CLI-yolo trust-boundary failure mode.

Resources:

  • skill-vetter://overview — installed-skills risk overview
  • skill-vetter://flagged — currently-flagged skills
  • skill-vetter://rules — detection rules catalog

Prompts:

  • pre-install-skill-check — vet a specific skill before installation
  • weekly-skill-audit — compose a 200-word weekly audit of all installed skills
  • agent-config-audit (v1.1+) — vet a project directory's agent-config files for adversarial content

Quickstart

Install

pip install openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp

Quick verify (~30 seconds, no config)

After install, run the bundled demo to see the vetter catch real malicious skill patterns:

openclaw-skill-vetter-mcp-demo

You'll see 6 hand-shaped skills vetted: typically 2 BLOCK (a data-extractor with hardcoded Discord webhook + os.system at risk_score 100/100; a requestz-typosquat of requests at 55/100) + 2 REVIEW (eval() + manifest-purpose drift) + 2 CLEAN. No external I/O, no API keys — safe to run anywhere. Useful first-30-seconds check before pointing at your real ~/.openclaw/skills/ directory.

Configure for Claude Desktop

Add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "openclaw-skill-vetter": {
      "command": "python",
      "args": ["-m", "openclaw_skill_vetter_mcp"],
      "env": {
        "OPENCLAW_SKILL_VETTER_BACKEND": "mock"
      }
    }
  }
}

Backends

BackendStatusDescription
mock✅ v1.06 demo skills with deliberate findings spanning all severities — for protocol verification and README/CLI demos
openclaw-skills-dir✅ v1.0Reads ~/.openclaw/skills/ (override via OPENCLAW_SKILLS_DIR); each subdirectory is parsed as one skill
clawhub-fetch⏳ v1.1Fetches a candidate skill from the ClawHub registry directly for vet-before-install workflows

Skill manifest format

Each skill directory contains a skill.yaml (or skill.json):

id: weather-fetch
name: Weather Fetch
version: 1.0.0
author: [email protected]
description: Fetches current weather for a city using OpenWeatherMap.
purpose: Live weather data lookup
runtime: python3.11
entry_point: main.py
permissions:
  - network.http: api.openweathermap.org
dependencies:
  - requests>=2.31
  - pydantic>=2.0
signature: ed25519:abcd1234efgh5678

Plus the actual code files (*.py, *.js, *.ts, *.sh, *.rb, *.go, *.rs) and any prompt files (*.prompt, *.md, *.txt).

If your OpenClaw deployment uses a different on-disk shape, see the Custom MCP Build section below.


Detection rules (v1.0)

Four scanner modules cover the v1.0 ruleset:

ManifestMANIFEST.MISSING, MANIFEST.PURPOSE_NETWORK_DRIFT, MANIFEST.WILDCARD_PERMISSION, MANIFEST.BROAD_FILESYSTEM_WRITE, MANIFEST.EMPTY_DESCRIPTION, MANIFEST.NO_AUTHOR, MANIFEST.UNSIGNED

Static patterns (text regex over code + prompts) —

  • Prompt-injection: PROMPT_INJ.IGNORE_PRIOR, PROMPT_INJ.ROLE_OVERRIDE, PROMPT_INJ.EXTRACT_SYSTEM, PROMPT_INJ.JAILBREAK_DAN, PROMPT_INJ.NEW_USER_MARKER
  • Exfiltration: EXFIL.WEBHOOK_DISCORD, EXFIL.WEBHOOK_SLACK, EXFIL.WEBHOOK_TELEGRAM, EXFIL.PASTEBIN_LITERAL, EXFIL.SSH_KEY_READ, EXFIL.AWS_CREDS_READ, EXFIL.ENV_DUMP, EXFIL.SUBPROCESS_CURL
  • Dynamic execution: DYN_EXEC.SHELL_TRUE, DYN_EXEC.OS_SYSTEM, DYN_EXEC.EVAL_LITERAL, DYN_EXEC.EXEC_LITERAL, DYN_EXEC.PICKLE_LOADS, DYN_EXEC.DYNAMIC_IMPORT
  • Obfuscation: OBFUSCATION.LARGE_BASE64, OBFUSCATION.LARGE_HEX

Python AST (catches what regex misses) — AST.EVAL_CALL, AST.EXEC_CALL, AST.COMPILE_CALL, AST.OS_SYSTEM, AST.OS_POPEN, AST.OS_EXECV, AST.SUBPROCESS_RUN_SHELL_TRUE, AST.SUBPROCESS_POPEN_SHELL_TRUE, AST.DYNAMIC_IMPORT

DependenciesDEP.TYPOSQUAT, DEP.HOMOGLYPH, DEP.UNTRUSTED_GIT_SOURCE, DEP.LOCAL_PATH

Use list_detection_rules to query the live catalog.


Risk scoring

Each finding contributes by severity:

SeverityWeight
CRITICAL40
HIGH15
MEDIUM5
LOW1
INFO0

Final risk_score = min(sum, 100). Bucketing (first match wins):

BucketTrigger
BLOCK≥1 CRITICAL or score ≥ 80
REVIEW≥1 HIGH or score ≥ 50
CAUTION≥1 MEDIUM or score ≥ 20
CLEANno findings or only INFO

Conservative-by-design: false positives are OK, missed criticals are not. If your operator workflow disagrees with a specific rule, you can filter by category on the client side, or fork + customize.


Roadmap

VersionScopeStatus
v1.0mock + openclaw-skills-dir backends, 7 tools / 3 resources / 2 prompts, 4 scanner modules with 41 detection rules, GitHub Actions CI matrix, PyPI Trusted Publishing
v1.1clawhub-fetch backend (vet a skill from ClawHub before install); CVE-DB lookup for dependencies; signature verification against ClawHub publisher keys
v1.2Sandbox-execution scanner (run skill in isolated process, observe network attempts); whitelist/allowlist per-operator
v1.xCustom rule packs; integration with existing SAST tools; per-rule severity overrides

Need this adapted to your stack?

If your AI deployment doesn't use the OpenClaw skill format — different agent harness, custom skill schema, monolithic skill files, internal-registry distribution — and you want the same vet-before-install discipline, that's a Custom MCP Build engagement.

TierScopeInvestmentTimeline
SimpleSingle backend adapter for your existing skill format$8,000–$12,0001–2 weeks
StandardCustom backend + custom rule pack tuned to your ecosystem + CI integration$15,000–$25,0002–4 weeks
ComplexMulti-format ingestion + sandbox-execution + signed-publisher allowlist + rule-tuning workshop$30,000–$45,0004–8 weeks

To engage:

  1. Email [email protected] with subject Custom MCP Build inquiry — skill vetting
  2. Include: 1-paragraph description of your skill ecosystem + which tier you're considering
  3. Reply within 2 business days with a 30-min discovery call slot

This server is part of a production-AI infrastructure MCP suite — companion to silentwatch-mcp, openclaw-health-mcp, and openclaw-cost-tracker-mcp. Install all four for full operational visibility.


Production AI audits

If you're running production AI and want an outside practitioner to score readiness, find the failure patterns already present (ClawHavoc-style skill malware being one of the most damaging), and write the corrective-action plan:

TierScopeInvestmentTimeline
Audit LiteOne system, top-5 findings, written report$1,5001 week
Audit StandardFull audit, all 14 patterns, 5 Cs findings, 90-day follow-up$3,0002–3 weeks
Audit + WorkshopStandard audit + 2-day team workshop + first monthly audit included$7,5003–4 weeks

Same email channel: [email protected] with subject AI audit inquiry.


Contributing

PRs welcome. Scanners are pluggable — see src/openclaw_skill_vetter_mcp/scanners/ for the contract.

To add a new scanner:

  1. Create scanners/<your_scanner>.py exporting SCANNER_NAME: str and def scan(skill: Skill) -> list[Finding]
  2. Optionally export def all_rules() -> list[tuple[...]] for the rules catalog
  3. Register in analysis.vet_skill (the orchestrator iterates over a fixed tuple of scanner modules)
  4. Add tests in tests/test_scanners.py

To add a new backend:

  1. Subclass SkillBackend in backends/<your_backend>.py
  2. Implement get_skills, get_skill_by_id, get_directory
  3. Register in backends/__init__.py
  4. Add tests in tests/test_backend_<your_backend>.py

Bug reports + feature requests: open a GitHub issue. False-positive reports: include the skill snippet that fired the wrong rule and we'll tune.


License

MIT — see LICENSE.


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Built by Temur Khan — production AI engineer. Contact: [email protected]

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